The Squadron finally commenced operations, participating in a raid on Berlin on the night of 2/3rd December 1943. This was part of a series of heavy raids against the German capital undertaken by Bomber Command throughout the winter of 1943/44.
A force of 458 aircraft, including 425 Lancasters, 18 Mosquitos, and 15 Halifaxes flew on this attack on Berlin; its fifth heavy raid within a fortnight. Seven Lancasters and crews from 576 Sqn were detailed for this attack, with briefing at 1400 and planned take-off at 1705. There were no major diversions and the bombers took a direct route across the North Sea and Holland, and then on to Berlin. The German air defences identified Berlin as the target about nineteen minutes before Zero Hour, and so there were many night fighters were waiting.
108 Lancasters, including 3 from 576 Sqn, to attack from zero +6 to zero +10
Fourth Wave
109 Lancasters, including 2 from 576 Sqn, to attack from zero +10 to zero +14
Fifth Wave
Remaining Lancasters to attack from zero +14 to zero +18
BOMB LOAD
'BASIC': 1 x 4,000lb HC, 4 SBCs each containing 12 x 30lb incendiaries, 8 SBCs each containing 90 x 4lb incendiaries, and 2 SBCs each containing 60 x 4lb incendiaries.??
Plus 2 SBCs each containing 150 x 4lb incendiaries, 1 SBC containing 90 x 4lb incendiaries, and 1 SBC containing 8 x 30lb incendiaries
Minimum Fuel Load
1793 gallons
NOTES
19 ABC aircraft from 101 Sqn to be spread evenly over the period zero to zero +18.
Plus Main Force crews were specially warned not, repeat not, to bomb before zero hour
WINDOW
Start Rate
C: 1 bundle / min
At 52°47N 03°45E
381 bundles per aircraft
Start Rate
D: 2 bundle / min
At 52°35N 12°31E
Stop Finally
At 52°47N 03°45E
METHOD
The method for the attack was to be mixed PARAMATTA and WANGANUI.
Route marking red TIs to be dropped at 52°38N 09°45E outbound.
Wanganui flares consisting of bundles of red flares with green stars would be dropped to mark the Release Point throughout the attack, and green TIs to mark the Aiming Point. The attack would be opened with red TIs dropped in the target area (to be used by Pathfinders only and to be ignored by the Main Force).
Main Force aircraft were to aim their bombs on an exact heading of 105°M at the centre of all visible green TIs; otherwise they should aim at the centre of all red with green stars TIs while holding an exact heading of 105°M.
Red TI route markers would be dropped at 52°38N 09°45E on the way home.
Crews were also warned that Mosquitoes would be dropping spoof fighter flares about 20 miles south of the target. These would ignite at 20,000ft.
TACTICS
Aircraft to rendezvous at 52°50N 03°30E between 18000 and 20000 ft, and to cross the enemy coast outbound between 19000 and 22000 ft. They will then proceed to the target and bomb as high as possible between 19000 and 22000 ft, this height band to be maintained as far as the enemy coast on the homeward route.
ORDER OF BATTLE
?? UL-K2
?? DV333
Flt Sgt C E O"Neill RCAF
1710-2359
Sgt J A A Mansfield
Sgt R H McLeod
Sgt S Hewitt
Sgt J R Ingham
Sgt G A Coon RCAF
Sgt N Conner
?? UL-R2
????W4337
Flt Sgt J M Booth RAAF
1705-DNR
Sgt G H Kaye
Flt Sgt L W L Godfrey RAAF
Flt Sgt R E D Richards RAAF
Flt Sgt M N Jennings RAAF
Flt Sgt M W Jones RAAF
Flt Sgt D R G Taskis RAAF
?? UL-T2
?? ED767
Sgt D Arlott
1705-0005
Sgt D Arlott
Sgt P W Green
Plt Off M A Elliott
Sgt J P Gray
Sgt H L Morrison RCAF
Sgt L Mulholland
?? UL-U2
????ED913
Fg Off J H Richards
1649-2355
Sgt C P Rudland
Sgt G Evans
Sgt A E Hooper
Sgt S W Irons
Sgt C Milburn
Sgt H Johnson
?? UL-V2
?? ED888
WO T J Bassett RAAF
1652-1855
Sgt E A Brown
Sgt J M W Pasley
Sgt B R Round
Flt Sgt W H Rogers RAAF
Sgt A J Palfreman
Flt Sgt L Brettell
?? UL-Y2
????JA968
WO M J Graham
1705-0005
Sgt G P Rae
Sgt W J C Keigwin
Sgt K W Flowers
Sgt P Harris
Sgt P J Daly
Sgt D Roberts
?? UL-Z2
?? LM332
Sgt R Whalley
1700-2010
Sgt C Van de Velde
Sgt S J Barr
Sgt J D Ward
Sgt F Burgess
Sgt J McCool
Sgt R Scott
NARRATIVE OF THE ATTACK
An inaccurate wind forecast caused great difficulties for the Pathfinders, who were not able to establish their positions correctly and blew many aircraft off track. Squadron records report a thin layer of cloud over the target area but that the Pathfinder ground markers were clearly seen. Fighter flares were in great evidence and the flak was reported as moderate.
The bombing photographs of the Main Force suggested that the attack was scattered over a wide area of southern Berlin and the countryside south of the city. The Berlin report confirms this, but adds that some damage was caused in industrial areas of the eastern and western districts, with two more of the Siemens factories, a ball-bearing factory and several railway installations, being badly hit. Damage elsewhere was light, and only 136 buildings were destroyed. Only four photographs were brought back by the Squadron but, due to the low cloud, they only recorded fire tracks and smoke. The incorrectly forecast winds scattered the bomber stream, particularly on the return flight, and German fighters scored further victories here. A total of 40 aircraft, including 37 Lancasters (including the Squadron"s first operational loss), two Halifaxes, and one Mosquito, were lost. One Squadron aircraft, UL-R2, commanded by Flt Sgt Booth, RAAF, failed to return from this operation, crashing near M??nchengladbach. Unusually, apart from flight engineer Sgt Kaye, all the crew were Australian. WO Bassett in UL-V2, and Sgt Whalley in UL-Z2 both returned early due to engine failures. UL-U2 (Fg Off Richards) and UL-Y2 (WO Graham) were damaged by enemy fire but returned safely. The Bomber Command Night Raid Report is below.