FRIDAY, 21 JAN 1944

MAGDEBURG

A large force of 421 Lancasters, 224 Halifaxes, and 3 Mosquitos, flew on this, the first major raid on Magdeburg of the war. The German controller followed the progress of the bomber stream across the North Sea and many night fighters were in the stream before it crossed the German coast. The controller was very slow to identify Magdeburg as the target but this did not matter too much because most of the night fighters were able to stay in the bomber stream, a good example of the way the Zahme Sau (Tame Boar) tactics were developing.

BRIEFING

Purpose

To cause maximum damage to the target area

Date

Night of 21/22 January 1944

576 Aircraft Detailed

10

Target Code

GRILSE

Route

Elsham Wolds - Mablethorpe - 54˚30N 06˚40E - 53˚20N 09˚31E - 52˚47N 12˚00E - Target - 51˚55N 11˚18E - 53˚20N 09˚31E - 54˚30N 06˚40E - Mablethorpe - Elsham Wolds

TIMING

Zero Hour

2300 hrs

First Wave

117 Lancasters, including 4 from 576 Sqn, to attack from zero to zero +4, and manned by specially selected crews

Second Wave

96 Halifaxes, to attack from zero +4 to zero +8

Third Wave

98 Halifaxes, to attack from zero +4 to zero +8

Fourth Wave

119 Lancasters, including 4 from 576 Sqn, to attack from zero +11 to zero +15

Fifth Wave

All remaining Lancasters to attack from zero +14 to zero +18

BOMB LOAD

Bomb Load

'BASIC': 1 x 4,000lb HC; 4 SBCs each containing 12 x 30lb incendiaries; 8 SBCs each containing 90 x 4lb incendiaries; and 2 SBCs each containing 60 x 4lb incendiaries.

Plus 2 SBCs each containing 150 x 4lb incendiaries; 1 SBC containing 90x 4lb 'X'-Type incendiaries; and 1 SBC containing 8 x 30lb incendiaries.

Minimum Fuel Load

1700 gallons

NOTES

16 ABC aircraft from 101 Sqn to be spread evenly over the period of the attack.

All crews were briefed that if they were to find themselves in distress over the North Sea, they are to disclose the nature of their distress by the appropriate groups in the Bomber Code when requesting an M/F fix or transmitting an SOS.

WINDOW

Start Rate 'C' - 1 bundle / min

54˚27N 06˚25E

211 bundles per aircraft

Start Rate 'D' - 2 bundles / min

52˚42N 11˚56E

Start Rate 'C' - 1 bundle / min

52˚23N 10˚42E

Stop Finally

54˚27N 06˚25E

METHOD

The method for this attack would be NEWHAVEN ground-marking together with WANGANUI sky-marking.

Route markers were to be dropped at the following positions outbound:

Position 'P' 54˚05N 07˚40E (green flares with yellow stars)

Position 'Q' 53˚16N 09˚51E (red spot fires)

The attack was to open with sticks of white illuminating flares and green TIs dropped in the target area. The Aiming Point would then be marked with large salvoes of red TIs. These would be dropped at zero -4 and would not be visible after zero +5. The Aiming Point would then be kept marked with green TIs throughout the attack.

Main Force aircraft in the first wave are to aim at the red TIs if visible, otherwise at the centre of all green TIs. Main Force aircraft in the fourth and fifth waves were to aim their bombs only at the centre of all visible green TIs. Red TIs seen after zero +5 were to be assumed to be decoys and were emphatically not to be bombed.

If cloud conditions prevented the TIs being seen, the Release Point would be marked with bundles of red flares with green stars throughout the attack. In this case, Main Force aircraft were to aim at the centre of the Release Point flares on an exact heading of 214˚M, with the usual WANGANUI bomb sight settings (true height and air speed, and zero wind).

Homeward bound, red spot fire route-markers would be dropped at 52˚21N 10˚41E.

Crews were warned that 20 Lancasters of 5 Group and 17 Pathfinder Mosquitoes would be making a spoof attack on 'WHITEBAIT' (Berlin) at zero -6.

TACTICS

Aircraft were to climb en route to the RV position at 5430N 0640E to between 19000 and 21000 ft. They were then to cross the enemy coast between 20000 and 23000 ft, and maintain that height to the target. On leaving the target area all aircraft were to climb as high as possible between 22000 and 24000 ft and maintain that height until crossing 07˚E homeward bound.

ORDER OF BATTLE

UL-C² LM438 Fg Off J M Shearer NZRAF Did not take off

Sgt C N G Drew

Sgt J A Ford RAAF

Flt Sgt A H Biltoft RAAF

Sgt C V Fox

Sgt J W McLeod RAAF

Sgt A R Jackson RAAF

UL-D² JA715 Sgt A J Bodger 1925-0230

Sgt R P Lloyd

Sgt S G Barnes

Sgt W Scott

Sgt K Watkins

Sgt P W Robert

Sgt J A Russell

UL-F² ME583 Sgt A C Blackie 1950-0300

Sgt G Nicol

Sgt C E Hammond

Sgt J A Cooper

Sgt H Williams

Sgt A K Gray

Sgt A J Newman

UL-K² JB744 Sgt R Whalley 1945-0230

Sgt C Van de Velde

Sgt S J Barr

Sgt J D Ward

Sgt F Burgess

Sgt J McCool

Sgt R Scott

UL-P² ND386 Flt Sgt H M C Thomas 1940-0220

Sgt D Arlott

Sgt A E Danslow

Plt Off M A Elliott

Sgt C L Radbone

Sgt H L Morrison RCAF

Sgt L Mulholland

UL-Q² ND362 Flt Sgt C E O'Neill RCAF 2015-0330

Sgt J A A Mansfield

Fg Off J B Armstrong RCAF

Sgt S Hewitt

Sgt J Anderson

Sgt G A Coon RCAF

Sgt H Winn

UL-R² ND402 Flt Sgt H R Marsden 1950-0245

Sgt C P Rudland

Sgt J M W Pasley

Sgt D Waterhouse

Sgt R W Williams

Sgt R E Rogers RCAF

Sgt M A Frost

UL-V² ED888 Fg Off G S Morgan 1940-0230

Sgt J R Mearns

Sgt N A Lambell RAAF

Plt Off E McP Graham

Sgt J R O'Hanlon

Sgt S S Greenwood

Sgt C E Shilling

UL-W² ND385 WO C C Rollins 1930-0245

Sgt E D Roff

Fg Off H L Rees RCAF

Sgt J Rutter

Sgt R Hammond

Sgt L S Sumak RCAF

Sgt W M Boston

UL-Y² JA868 Sgt F B Gipson 2000-0315

Sgt J R Randall

Sgt J P Gregory

Sgt H Q Stevenson

Flt Sgt J M Walker RAAF

Sgt P T Lalor

Sgt J S Robertson

NARRATIVE OF THE ATTACK

The weather en-route was mostly overcast, which broke up on the approach to the target leaving scattered and broken cloud with tops between 3,000ft and 10,000ft. The markers that were dropped for the earlier stages of the attack were very scattered, and appeared to fall to the south-west of the target. In the latter stages, however, a much better concentration developed, and the target marking would appear to have become more accurate. For the most part, crews bombed on the green TIs which were maintained in excellent profusion. Very few red TIs were seen, nor at any stage was there a concentration of Release Point flares.

The heavy bomber casualties sustained on the raid were not rewarded with a successful attack; some of the Main Force aircraft now had H₂S and the winds, which were stronger than forecast, brought some of these aircraft into the target area well ahead of zero hour. The crews of 27 aircraft were anxious to bomb and therefore did so before zero hour. Markers and bombs were scattered south of the target area but a much better concentration was achieved as the attack progressed and the Pathfinder markers became more accurate.

That the attack finally succeeded in raising very big fires in the target area was indicated by the fact that the glow of these fires was visible up to 150 miles away with smoke reported up to 15000 ft, and many big explosions were reported in the latter stages of the attack. One explosion occurred at 0001 hrs and was seen by several crews as appearing to light up the whole sky in the target area for several seconds. The Pathfinders blamed the fires started by the early bombing, together with some very effective German decoy markers, for their failure to concentrate the marking.

Photographic information was very limited but one photograph has been plotted 1¾ miles east of the Aiming Point which shows bomb bursts and TI markers. No ground detail was recorded on 576 Squadron cameras due to a thin layer of cloud cover over the target.

Ground defences were negligible in the early stages but the flak was never more than slight to moderate, and the defences appeared saturated in the later stages of the attack. There were only a few ineffective searchlights. There was considerable night fighter activity in the target area but no combats were reported by 576 Squadron. Fighter flares were reported from the enemy coast to the target, and on the homeward trip. Fighters were especially active between Hamburg and Heligoland, and of the 7 combats which developed involving 1 Gp aircraft, five took place on this leg of the route. In total, 55 aircraft were lost; most of those were due to German night fighters.

Fg Off Shearer and crew in UL-C² did not take off due to aircraft unserviceability. All other crews reached the target and returned to Elsham safely.

UL-K², flown by Sgt Whalley, was damaged by flak.

The Bomber Command Night Raid Report is attached below.

COMBAT REPORTS

Nil

FLIGHT TRAINING

UL-G² ED767 Sgt Murray - Night cross-country - Base-Barnard Castle-Base (1:30)

(logbook of Flt Sgt HST Harris)

ELSHAM WOLDS

The following officers visited the Station in connection with a District Court Martial being held here, they were Sqn Ldr Roseberry from HQ 11 Base at RAF Lindholme, Flt Off Nock of HQ 1 Gp at RAF Bawtry, Flt Offs Hallett and Emerson of RAF Ludford Magna, and Sect Off Mackay of 209 MU at RAF Broughton. The District Court Martial was held for the purpose of trying 2060615 LACW J Taylor.

Staff visits were made by Flt Lt MacDonald of HQ Bomber Command, RAF High Wycombe, and Flt Lt Skillitter of HQ 1 Gp at RAF Bawtry, while visits on signals matters were made by Flt Lt Mallinson and Plt Off Eiries, also from HQ 1 Gp.

Cinema show tonight (feature film not recorded)