Date

Night of 20/21 January 1944

576 Aircraft Detailed

10

Target Code

WHITEBAIT

Route

Elsham Wolds - Mablethorpe - 54˚25N 08˚00E - 53˚37N 10˚55E - 53˚28N 12˚40E - Target - 52˚20N 13˚30E - 51˚38N 12˚20E - 52˚07N 07˚50E - 53˚30N 05˚45E - 53˚40N 04˚00E - Mablethorpe - Elsham Wolds

TIMING

Zero Hour

1935 hrs

First Wave

124 Lancasters, including 4 from 576 Sqn, to attack from zero to zero +4, and manned by specially selected crews.

Second Wave

132 Halifaxes to attack from zero +4 to zero +8

Third Wave

131 Halifaxes to attack from zero +7 to zero +11

Fourth Wave

125 Lancasters, including 3 from 576 Sqn, to attack from zero +11 to zero +15

Fifth Wave

All remaining Lancasters to attack from zero +14 to zero +18

BOMB LOAD

'BASIC': 1 x 4,000lb HC; 4 SBCs each containing 12 x 30lb incendiaries; 8 SBCs each containing 90 x 4lb incendiaries; and 2 SBCs each containing 60 x 4lb incendiaries.

Plus 2 SBCs each containing 150 x 4lb incendiaries; 1 SBC containing 90x 4lb 'X'-Type incendiaries; and 1 SBC containing 8 x 30lb incendiaries.

Minimum Fuel Load

1690 gallons

NOTES

20 ABC aircraft to be spread evenly over the period of the attack.

The importance of keeping to the times and to the track laid down for the attack was strongly emphasised: the route had been chosen with a view to deceiving enemy defences, and its value would be lost if the Main Force were to become scattered.

WINDOW

Start Rate 'C' - 1 bundle / min

54˚02N 05˚02E

269 bundles per aircraft

Start Rate 'D' - 2 bundles / min

53˚07N 12˚55E

Start Rate 'C' - 1 bundle / min

51˚55N 12˚48E

Stop Finally

53˚38N 04˚25E

METHOD

The method for the attack was to be mixed PARAMATTA and WANGANUI.

Green route marker flares with yellow stars would be dropped at the following positions outbound:

Position 'P' 54˚25N 08˚00E

Position 'Q' 53˚22N 12˚43E

The attack was to open with red TIs dropped in the target area. The Aiming Point would then be marked with green TIs, and kept marked throughout the attack. In addition, the Release Point would be marked with bundles of red flares with green stars throughout the attack.

Main Force aircraft were to aim at the centre of all visible green TIs. If cloud conditions prevented the TIs from being seen, Main Force aircraft were to aim at the centre of all Release Point flare (red with green stars) while holding an exact heading of 165˚M. In this case, bomb sights were to be set for true height and air speed, but zero wind.

Green route-marker flares with yellow stars would be dropped at Position 'R' (51˚38N 12˚20E) homeward bound.

Crews were briefed that Mosquitoes would be conducting a spoof attack on 'MINNOW' (Kiel) with bombs and red TIs. Other Mosquitoes would drop spoof fighter flares 20 miles east of 'WHITEBAIT' (Berlin) and would also drop a spoof red route marker TI and a red flare at 52˚33N 10˚00E homeward bound.

TACTICS

Aircraft were to climb en route to the RV position at 54˚25N 08˚00E to between 19000 and 20000 ft. They were then to cross the enemy coast outbound between 20000 and 22000 ft, and maintain that height to the target.

After leaving the target area, all aircraft were to climb as high as possible between 21000 and 23000 ft and maintain that height until crossing the enemy coast homewards.

ORDER OF BATTLE

UL-C² LM438 Fg Off J M Shearer NZRAF 1620-2350

Sgt C N G Drew

Sgt J A Ford RAAF

Flt Sgt A H Biltoft RAAF

Sgt C V Fox

Sgt J W McLeod RAAF

Sgt A R Jackson RAAF

UL-D² JA715 Sgt A J Bodger 1550-2310

Sgt R P Lloyd

Sgt S G Barnes

Sgt W Scott

Sgt K Watkins

Sgt P W Robert

Sgt J A Russell

Mr Coggins (observer)

UL-F² ME583 Sgt A C Blackie 1615-2335

Sgt G Nicol

Sgt C E Hammond

Sgt J A Cooper

Sgt H Williams

Sgt A K Gray

Sgt A J Newman

UL-K² JB744 Sgt R Whalley 1610-2330

Sgt C Van de Velde

Sgt S J Barr

Sgt J D Ward

Sgt F Burgess

Sgt A K Gray

Sgt G M Morris

UL-P² ND386 Flt Sgt H M C Thomas 1600-2320

Sgt D Arlott

Sgt A E Danslow

Plt Off M A Elliott

Sgt C L Radbone

Sgt H L Morrison RCAF

Sgt L Mulholland

UL-Q² ND362 Flt Sgt C E O'Neill RCAF 1610-2340

Sgt J A A Mansfield

Fg Off J B Armstrong RCAF

Sgt S Hewitt

Sgt J R Ingham

G A Coon RCAF

Sgt B J Hudson

UL-R² ND402 Flt Sgt H R Marsden 1615-2325

Sgt C P Rudland

Sgt J M W Pasley

Sgt D Waterhouse

Sgt R W Williams

Sgt R E Rogers RCAF

Sgt M A Frost

UL-V² ED888 Fg Off G S Morgan 1610-2325

Sgt J R Mearns

Sgt N A Lambell RAAF

Plt Off E McP Graham

Sgt J R O'Hanlon

Sgt S S Greenwood

Sgt C E Shilling

UL-W² ND385 WO C C Rollins & 1600-2345

Sgt R R Reed

Sgt E D Roff

Fg Off H L Rees RCAF

Sgt J Rutter

Sgt R Hammond

Sgt L S Sumak RCAF

Sgt W M Boston

UL-Y² JA868 Sgt F B Gipson 1620-2350

Sgt J R Randall

Sgt J P Gregory

Sgt H Q Stevenson

Flt Sgt J M Walker RAAF

Sgt P T Lalor

Sgt J S Robertson

NARRATIVE OF THE ATTACK

Haze and low cloud dominated the route out, and this gradually increased from 07˚E. Apart from occasional gaps, the route was almost completely obscured by 10/10 cloud with tops between 10000 and 15000 ft. Under these conditions, only very few crews found it possible to bomb the ground-markers and most of the crews relied on sky-markers dropped by the PFF. The 1 Group crews unanimously reported that the markers were on time, although at first, they appeared to be somewhat scattered and to the east, running in a line across the target to the west. As the attack developed however, the sky-marker flares became centred to the west and over a built-up area to the east detected by the bombers on H2S. The markers were well maintained in a good sequence, and the bombing appears to have been well concentrated, reports indicating that a good healthy red glow developed over a large area which was visible 60 miles away, and a large spiral of smoke was seen ascending to over 25000 ft in the later stages of the attack. Several explosions took place in the target area, one at 1943 hrs was followed by three very large yellowish explosions at about 1950 hrs.

Although the approach route took a wide swing to the north, the German controller managed to feed his fighters into the bomber stream early and the fighters scored steadily until the force was well on the way home. The diversion raids on Düsseldorf, Kiel, and Hanover were not large enough to deceive the Germans.

Opposition from ground forces early in the attack was reported as almost negligible and not nearly so formidable as on previous occasions. Fighter flares were equally sparse. Numerous sightings of enemy aircraft were, however, reported and some 42 out of the 52 sightings took place in and around the target area. Although 576 Sqn reported no combats, there were a few particularly in the Berlin/Leipzig area and one 20 miles south-east of the Muritz Lake. All combats proved inconclusive although another 1 Group aircraft's two air gunners were killed by cannon fire. Flares were noted as far back as the Dutch coast on the homeward journey.

All 576 Squadron crews believed they had dropped their bombs on the target, and they all returned safely to base. No ground detail was available from photographs due to the overcast conditions and no photographic reconnaissance was possible until after a further four raids on Berlin were carried out, but the various sources from which the Berlin reports are normally drawn all showed a complete blank for this night.

A total of 35 aircraft, including thirteen Lancasters, were lost.

COMBAT REPORTS

Nil

FLIGHT TRAINING

2x Day cross-country exercises with bombing.

ELSHAM WOLDS

To attack Berlin tonight, all the aircraft detailed; 22 in number (from both 103 and 576 Sqns), reached the primary target and all returned safely.

The Recorded Music Circle met for an illustrated talk by Miss Iris Lemare of Purcell's opera "Dido and Aeneno". This was followed by a concert of Tchaikovsky records.

The King has been graciously pleased to give orders for the publication of the names of the following personnel who have been mentioned in despatches by Air Officers Commanding-in-Chief: