101 aircraft, including 4 Lancasters from 576 Sqn, to attack from zero to zero +4, and manned by the best crews.
Second Wave
99 aircraft, including 3 Lancasters from 576 Sqn, to attack from zero +4 to zero +8
Third Wave
All remaining Lancasters to attack from zero +8 to zero +12
BOMB LOAD
‘BASIC’: 1 x 4,000lb HC, 4 SBCs each containing 12 x 30lb incendiaries, 7 SBCs each containing 90 x 4lb incendiaries, and 1 SBC containing 90 x 4lb ‘X’ type incendiaries.
Minimum Fuel Load
2154 gallons
NOTES
13 ABC aircraft from 101 Sqn to be spread evenly over the period of the attack.
The importance of good concentration and time-keeping was stressed at the briefing, and a reminder given that in moonlight conditions a good concentration is the best form of defence against night fighters.
WINDOW
Start Rate ‘C’ - 1 bundle / min
56°00N 07°20E
245 bundles per aircraft
Start Rate ‘D’ - 2 bundles / min
53°50N 13°51E
Start Rate ‘C’ - 1 bundle / min
53°58N 14°53E
Stop Rate ‘C’
54°18N 14°56E
Start Rate ‘C’ - 1 bundle / min
56°00N 13°00E
Stop Finally
56°00N 07°20E
METHOD
Method for the attack to be NEWHAVEN ground marking, with WANGANUI as an emergency.
Route markers were to be dropped at the following places outward bound:
Position ‘P’: Green flares with yellow stars at 56°00N 11°18E
Position ‘Q’: Yellow TIs at 54°05N 13°23E
The attack was to open with sticks of flares and with green TIs dropped in the target area. The Aiming Point was to be marked with red TIs, and kept marked with green TIs. If cloud obscured the target, red WANGANUI flares with green stars were to be dropped throughout the attack to mark the Release Point.
Main Force aircraft were to aim their bombs at the centre of all green TIs, if visible. It was strongly emphasised that they were not to aim at any red TIs. If the cloud should prevent the green TIs from being seen, Main Force aircraft were to aim their bombs at the centre of all the red flares with green stars on an exact heading of 143°M, in this case with the usual WANGANUI bombsight settings (true height and air speed, and zero wind).
For the homeward journey, green route marker flares with yellow stars were to be dropped at Position ‘R’ (55°00N 15°05E).
A spoof attack was to be carried out on ‘WHITEBAIT’ (Berlin) using red and green TIs at zero -20.
TACTICS
Aircraft were to climb en route to rendezvous at 56°00N 06°00E between 18000 and 20000 ft, and to cross 08°00E outbound between 19000 and 22000 ft. This height bracket was to be maintained throughout the operation, including bomb release, until west of 07°00E homeward bound.
ORDER OF BATTLE
UL-C2 DV333
Flt Lt E D Smith
Sgt L H Kirkpatrick PoW
Sgt B Suffolk PoW
Fg Off S R Wilkins PoW
Fg Off K H D Wilde
WO1 F A Larsen RCAF
Flt Sgt A R McAlhome PoW
Sgt N A Dixon RCAF
0005-DNR
UL-D2 JA715
Sgt R Whalley
Sgt C Van de Velde
Sgt S J Barr
Sgt J D Ward
Sgt F Burgess
Sgt J McCool
Sgt R Scott
2330-0830
UL-E2 LM381
Flt Lt T W G Morren
Sgt B Boothman
Sgt A C Jackson
Flt Sgt F C Hickling
Flt Sgt A E Unwin RAAF
Sgt A Barclay
Sgt B E Clarke
2350-0840
UL-G2 ND416
Plt Off J R Henningham, RAAF
Sgt A S Baker
Sgt K F F Barton
Sgt A S Davis
Sgt F J Wright
Sgt J L Colbourne
Sgt J E Kennison
2350-DNR
UL-K2 JB744
Sgt A C Blackie
Sgt G Nicol
Sgt C E Hammond
Sgt J A Cooper
Sgt H Williams
Sgt A K Gray
Sgt A J Newman
0005-0905
UL-P2 ND386
Flt Sgt H M C Thomas
Sgt D Arlott
Sgt K R Sumner
Plt Off M A Elliott
Sgt C L Radbone
Sgt H L Morrison RCAF
Sgt L Mulholland
2350-0220
UL-Q2 ND362
Flt Sgt C E O’Neill RCAF
Sgt J A A Mansfield
Fg Off J B Armstrong RCAF
Sgt S Hewitt
Sgt J R Ingham
Sgt G A Coon RCAF
Sgt N Conner
2330-0755
UL-R2 ND402
Flt Sgt H R Marsden
Sgt C P Rudland
Sgt J M W Pasley
Sgt D Waterhouse
Sgt R W Williams
Sgt R E Rogers RCAF
Sgt M A Frost
2345-0835
UL-V2 ED888
Flt Lt C A B Johnson
Sgt G B Valentine
Fg Off H Gerus RCAF
Fg Off W Woodfine
Sgt N H Morris
Sgt W R Owen
Sgt J P Duns RCAF
0000-0930
UL-W2 WD385
Sgt D G Mann
Sgt J W T Anderson
Sgt R Mosley
Fg Off B N J Price
Sgt F D Robbins
Sgt P T Lalor
Sgt R L McManus RCAF
2359-0900
UL-Y2 JA868
Sqn Ldr M R Attwater
Sgt A Burgess
Flt Sgt M A Grace RCAF
Flt Sgt D S S Potter
Sgt K W Taylor
Sgt K W Harris
Flt Lt C Hill
2330-0835
NARRATIVE OF THE ATTACK
10/10 cloud with tops around 10000 ft was encountered en route all the way to the target. There, however, was a good break at Stettin and the visibility was only marred by slight haze. The Pathfinders opened the attack punctually and their marking was reported to have been very well concentrated; most crews were able to confirm visually their accuracy. Visibility was excellent, and the bright moon combined with the snow on the ground to clearly identify the town. Crews reported being able to clearly see the River Oder and could make out the outline of streets which were lit up by the ground markers and the many fires which had started. The Aiming Point was well marked by plentiful and concentrated ground markers, and all but very few of the crews who attacked the primary bombed on those, which were maintained in good profusion throughout the attack.
Before the attack had finished, the whole town of Stettin was enveloped in a mass of large fires and many large explosions could be seen in the town centre from 150 miles away on the return journey. Smoke from these was reported rising to a very considerable height. Crews also reported very favourably on the Pathfinders’ route marking technique, finding the flares more useful than the ground markers.
The ground defences would appear to have been overwhelmed by the weight of the attack and the heavy flak was very moderate and in barrage form with slightly more intense light flak. The 576 report states that the searchlights few and ineffective.
The diversionary attack on Berlin seems to have been successful in drawing off a considerable portion of the night fighter defences, since fighter flares were seen at considerable distances to the south between Stettin and Berlin. Very few fighters or fighter flares were seen at the target until the end of the attack. No combats were reported by 576 Squadron, although there were five reported by other bombers (in two of which a Ju88 and a Me110 were claimed as probably damaged). No aircraft reported damage by flak.
Information on photographs is not complete, but one was plotted showing the Aiming Point with widespread fires over the own.
A total of sixteen aircraft - 14 Lancasters (including two from 576 Squadron), and two Halifaxes - were lost.
Flt Lt Smith, with Sgt Kirkpatrick as second pilot, and crew of UL-C2 on the first wave, and Plt Off Henningham and crew on UL-G2 on the third wave, did not return. All other crews returned safely to Elsham Wolds.
COMBAT REPORTS
Nil.
FLIGHT TRAINING
None recorded.
ELSHAM WOLDS
Operations tonight were carried out against Stettin. 23 aircraft were detailed, there being one abortive. Three of our aircraft are missing from this raid. One of our aircraft landed at Middleton St George.
Met: Weather conditions were as forecast.
BOMBER COMMAND NIGHT RAID REPORT No.504
DATE
05/06 JANUARY 1944
TARGET
STETTIN
SUMMARY
333 heavies, nearly all Lancasters, gave Stettin its first heaviest raid for 8½ months. The attack started accurately, in clear conditions, but subsequent undershooting drew the weight of the bombing away to the west of the town. The central district, however, was heavily damaged by fire, and a number of factories were hit. A diversionary attack on Berlin distracted the fighters, who allowed our aircraft to reach the target almost unmolested, and altogether only 5 attacks were reported by our returning crews. 27 bombers were lost.
Other Operations
Mosquitoes carried out a feint attack on Berlin, and precision raids against targets in Western Germany and the Cherbourg peninsula; Lancasters laid mines off Swinemunde, and other aircraft completed intruder patrols and meteorological reconnaissance flights.
WEATHER FORECAST
Midnight Frontal Positions
A warm front from Oslo – Wash – Lizard.
Bases
Much low cloud at 1000 ft in the frontal zone, with poor visibility and some fog. Ahead of the front, variable stratocumulus and moderate to poor visibility.
Bases should be fit for take-off shortly before midnight, except for low stratus and 1000 yds visibility in 1 and 5 Groups. For the return towards dawn, 1 and 5 Groups will have 1000 to 2000 yds visibility; elsewhere 1500 to 2000 yds.
Germany
Unsystematic widespread stratocumulus in the north (west of 15°E) and in the south-west. Good breaks in the north-east and central areas. Average thickness 2000 ft.
Stettin: Well-broken and well-spaced layers of medium cloud between 10000 ft and 20000 ft; little or no stratocumulus.
Various layers of cloud over the whole route, thickening towards Denmark but with good, clear lanes, especially above 15000 ft and west of 03°E.
France
Well-broken stratocumulus, dispersing to small amounts in the south, but increasing in the north late in the night.
En route to the target, green flares with yellow stars were to be dropped at 5600N 1118E (Sejero Bay) by Primary Blind Markers and Blind Backers-Up of 7 and 35 Squadrons. Yellow TIs were to be released at 54°05N 13°23E (64 miles north-west of Stettin)) by Primary Blind Markers and Blind Backers-Up of 83, 97, 156, and 405 Squadrons. On the way home, green flares with yellow stars were to be dropped at 55°00N 15°05E (110 miles north-north-east of Stettin) by the Primary Blind Markers and Blind Backers-Up of 7 and 35 Squadrons.
Method of Attack
Primary Blind Markers were to mark the Aiming Point with green TIs, also releasing either white or Release Point flares, depending on the weather found over the target. If there was less than 7/10 cloud cover and conditions seemed favourable for a NEWHAVEN attack, they were to drop white flares and green TIs (the first bundle of flares 45 seconds before the TIs, and the rest at 10-second intervals thereafter). But if conditions were such that the Visual Markers would be unable to identify the Aiming Point, one Release Point flare was to be dropped with each salvo of greens. Visual Markers were to use the greens only as a guide, marking the exact Aiming Point with reds after definite visual identification, and using white flares if necessary.
Visual Backers-Up were to aim greens at reds early in the attack, and later at the estimated centre of all earlier greens. If the early Visual Backers-Up found no red TIs burning, they were to aim their greens at the estimated centre of all the green TIs dropped by the Primary Blind Markers. If cloud hid the TIs, they were to hold their greens and bomb the Release Point flares on a heading of 143°M.
Blind Backers-Up, spread through the attack, were to drop Release Point flares on H2S if cloud prevented a NEWHAVEN raid; otherwise to hold their flares and join the Main Force.
Supporters were to bomb blindly if possible, otherwise at the centre of greens or at Release Point flares as detailed above.
Main Force aircraft were to bomb at the centre of greens, or (according to cloud conditions), the Release Point flares on a heading of 135°M.
TIMING
Zero Hour
0345 hrs
Duration of Attack
0339–0357 hrs
Primary Blind Markers
16 Lancasters
4 special Lancasters
At zero -6
Visual Markers
2 Halifaxes
5 Lancasters
To arrive at zero -4 and bomb as soon as possible
Visual Backers-Up
4 Lancasters
16 Lancasters
At zero -1
From zero to zero +11 (one per minute, but 2 at zero, zero +5, +6, +7)
Blind Backers-Up
8 Halifaxes
8 Lancasters
From zero -1 to zero +11 (one per minute, but 2 at zero +5, +7, +9)
Supporters
30 Lancasters
At zero -6
Main Force
First wave: 104 Lancasters
Second wave: 102 Lancasters
Third wave: 102 Lancasters
From zero to zero +4
From zero +4 to zero +8
From zero +8 to zero +12
Notes
13 ABC Lancasters throughout the attack.
MARKER LOADS
Primary Blind Markers
13 aircraft
7 aircraft
6x 4 white flares, 3x green TIs, 1x yellow TI, and 1x flare (red with green stars) internally
6x 4 white flares, 4x green TIs, 2x flares (green with yellow stars), and 1x flare (red with green stars) internally
Visual Markers
7 aircraft
1 x 4 white flares, and 8 red TIs
Visual Backers-Up
20 aircraft
4x green TIs
Blind Backers-Up
10 aircraft
6 aircraft
3x 4 flares (red with green stars), and 2x flares (green with yellow stars) internally
3x 4 flares (red with green stars) and 1x yellow TI
WINDOW
Aircraft flying to Stettin were to drop WINDOW at the rate of 1 bundle per minute until they were 40 miles from the target; thence to the target and for 40 miles beyond at 2 bundles per minute; and at 1 bundle per minute for the rest of the homeward route.
DIVERSIONARY ATTACKS
A feint attack was to be made on Berlin by 13 Mosquitoes, dropping red TIs and HE. 7 Mosquitoes were to attack at zero -20 on visual identification (if possible) after a timed run from the Maritz See. The rest, acting as backers-up, were to bomb at zero +17. WINDOW was to be dropped at the rate of 5 bundles per minute for the last 30 miles of the outward route.
SORTIES
Aircraft dispatched
358
Aircraft reporting attack on primary area
333
Sorties abortive
Technical defect / manipulative error
9
10
Fire from British aircraft
1
Aircraft missing
15
WEATHER EXPERIENCED
Bases
For take-off, visibility was 2-4 miles in 8 and 3 Groups, 1-1½ miles in 1 and 5 Groups, 1-6 miles in 4 Group, and good in 6 Group. Little low cloud except in the north of 6 Group. Better visibility on the return in 1, 4, and 5 Groups, and little change elsewhere. Large amounts of stratocumulus at 2-3000 ft.
Route
9-10/10 cover over the whole route, breaking to small amounts a few miles short of the target. Many layers over the North Sea and Denmark to 23000 ft. Tops over the Baltic were at 15-20000 ft. Slight static and light rime ice over the North Sea.
Stettin
Nearly clear skies, with patchy drifting cloud towards the close of the attack. Three-quarters moon setting at about zero +15. Excellent visibility.
NIGHT PHOTOGRAPHIC STATISTICS
No. of photographs examined
316
No. of photographs plotted in the target area (ground detail)
34
53
No. of photographs plotted in the target area (fire tracks)
19
No. of photographs plotted off the target area (ground detail)
116
208
No. of photographs plotted off the target area (fire tracks)
92
No. of aircraft estimated to have bombed in the target area (maximum)
67
No. of aircraft estimated to have bombed in the target area (minimum)
53
No. of aircraft estimated to have bombed in the target area (probable figure)
64
No. of aircraft estimated to have bombed within 3 miles (maximum)
230
No. of aircraft estimated to have bombed within 3 miles (minimum)
180
No. of aircraft estimated to have bombed within 3 miles (probable figure)
217
No. of aircraft reporting attack
333
NARRATIVE OF THE ATTACK
Since the target was almost clear of cloud, the NEWHAVEN technique was adopted, and the TIs dropped by the Primary Blind Markers were burning from zero 1- to zero +3. The attack opened on time, except one aircraft that bombed 4 minutes early, and the Blind Markers were successful in illuminating the target area.
The Visual Markers were also on time, and the first salvo of reds fell at zero -5, east of the river. Another salvo followed at zero -4, dead on the Aiming Point; another 3 miles to the north-west, and then 2 more on the Aiming Point within the next 2 minutes. The Visual Backers-Up began to arrive at zero -2, and 6 aircraft dropped their green TIs before those of the Primary Blind Markers had burnt out. 4 of these salvoes fell close to the Aiming Point, and should have centred the subsequent bombing on the reds of the visual markers. In fact, however, the Main Force bombing was centred 2 miles west of the Aiming Point, probably because the crews, having been instructed to aim at the centre of all visible greens, were distracted by TIs dropped short of the target by the Primary Blind Markers.
By zero +4, the TIs of the Primary Blind Markers had burnt out, and thereafter the Main Force bombed on those of the Visual Backers-Up. 10 of the latter attacked before zero +24, and all the 4 which have been plotted undershot considerably. By zero +6, the target area was covered with smoke from the fires burning, and no more photos were plotted on the built-up area; but the bombing appears to have spread still further westwards.
DAY RECONNAISSANCE
Most of the damage resulting from this attack was caused in the town centre, which suffered heavily from fire. Industrial property was most severely hit in the Silberwiese district on the south bank of the River Oder, where Rübenzucker-Fabriken GmbH (sugar refineries), and Pommerscher Industrie-Vieren (cement works), were affected. The buildings of the main railway station were almost entirely gutted, and scattered incidents occurred in the dock area, involving the Gross Kraft Werke II Stettin A.G. (power station) and the main goods station.
SPECIAL EQUIPMENT
H2S
Mk
Despatched
Attacked
Missing
Bombed blindly
No. aircraft dropping
H2S ‘s’
H2S ‘u/s’
RP flares
TIs
Blind Marker Illuminators
II
15
13
1
-
12
7
12
III
5
3
1
-
3
2
3
Secondary Blind Markers
II
16
11
3
2
8
3
-
Other Sorties
II
117
84
25
6
14
-
-
The timing and accuracy of the Blind Markers was excellent, so that the Aiming Point was well illuminated for the Visual Markers. The Secondary Blind Markers, who carried Reporting Point flares for emergency skymarking, were not required, and most of them dropped HE only. One MkIII PPI photograph has been plotted at 287° / 7 miles from the target.
ENEMY DEFENCES
Ground
The heavy guns of Stettin fired a loose barrage of light to moderate intensity, bursting at heights between 15000 ft and 20000 ft. Moderate light flak was encountered below 18000 ft, and multiple-bursting rockets were observed. No predicted flak was reported, and searchlights were ineffective despite the clear weather.
En route, the defences of Politz and Swinemunde were active, and opposition was met from Swedish guns, which fired light flak (including much self-destroying red tracer) to 18000 ft and heavy flak to 23000 ft.
At least 7 bombers, including one marker, were shot down by the target guns; none were lost on the way out, but one was destroyed near the coast on the first leg of the return journey.
Fighters
The feint attack on Berlin deceived the fighter controllers who, after assembling their aircraft over Rugen at zero -60, ordered them to the capital at zero -25. The fighters must have flown parallel to the course of the bombers between Rugen and the route markers at 54°05N 13°23E, but too early to make contact. Some saw the attack commence at Stettin and proceeded there uninstructed. Many fighter flares were seen in lanes from Greifswald to Berlin, but none were dropped over Stettin until the last stages of the raid.
CASUALTIES
Aircraft Missing
15
Aircraft Damaged
Flak
3
10
Fighter
3
Non-enemy action
4
8 aircraft were seen shot down by flak and 5 by fighters. 10 of these losses occurring over the target. Nothing is known of the fate of the other 2 missing aircraft. One Lancaster came down in the sea on the return journey after its compass had failed, and another was badly damaged in a taxying accident.
